In 1995 I wrote a short piece entitled 'The Forgotten "Trust": The People and the State'. 1 Its premise was the simple proposition that the most fundamental of fiduciary relationships in our society is that which exists between the State (and its officers and agencies) and the community (the people). I do not intend here to revisit the justifications for that proposition. My primary concern when I wrote was with two quite different legal manifestations of that proposition. The first was its use in informing and justifying the imposition of legally enforceable standards of conduct on public officers and agencies. The second was how trust and fiduciary ideas have been, and could be, invoked to circumscribe and channel the exercise of public power for the benefit or protection of the public or a section of it. It is the second -and much more problematic -of these that I wish to revisit in this article. I do so not simply to satisfy Leslie Zines that I have reconsidered a 'heresy' into which he believed I was misguidedly lured.
I begin with the commonplace observation that we live in the age of statutes and of government under statutes. It is in this statutory domain -a complex and burgeoning one -that the issues of channelling and controlling the exercise of public power now characteristically arise. It is this which explains the focus upon statutory interpretation and judicial review in what follows.
It needs to be acknowledged at the outset that there clearly are circumstances in which the Crown, or a public agency can be so circumstanced relative to particular property or to particular persons (almost invariably today as a consequence of a relationship created by or under statute) 2 as properly to require that it be characterised as a trustee of that property, 3 or as in a fiduciary relationship with those persons. 4 I will suggest though that at least in statutory settings we should be slow to embrace expansively principles drawn from the law of trusts and from fiduciary law so as to channel and control official decision making. My reasons for taking this view are 
IMPOSING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
Though this function of the common law has clear medieval antecedents, 9 it is sufficient to commence note of it after the tumultuous constitutional events of 17 th century in England. The medieval 'King's officer' had by then become the 'public officer'. Public offices were perceived to be ones of 'public trust and confidence', 10 and in time came to be defined by reference to the 'public's interest' in their exercise, hence the accepted modern definition that '[a] public officer is an officer who discharges any duty in the discharge of which the public are interested'. 11 By the end of the 18 th century there was a large and well developed body of primarily common law doctrine 
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Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries 337 ____________________________________________________________________________________ (both criminal and civil) applying to public officials because they were public officials. It regulated the use and exercise by officials of their 'several trusts'. 12 The reason and need for it were obvious enough. Put shortly, the powers and authorities possessed by virtue of office were not given for the officer's own benefit. Rather they were held so as to serve public purposes hence the 'public's concern', or 'interest', in the execution of such an office and the corresponding expectation of an official's integrity, diligence and good faith. 13 The substantive personal liabilities imposed on officials reflected the peculiarity of their position in the governmental order. The common law recognised that official conduct could affect two distinct interests: the one being that of the system of public governance itself, the efficacy and credibility of which depended upon the proper discharge of official functions; the other, that of the individual member(s) of the community, the object(s) of official action or decision. For centuries the law accommodated the demands of both interests in a dual system of accountability -a system which rendered an official responsible, first, to the King for the polity 14 (primarily through the criminal law), 15 and second, to the aggrieved citizen (primarily in tort). 16 The maturing of the prerogative writ system of judicial review blurred the dualism of this system, the writs within their separate provinces safeguarding the respective interests both of the Crown (and the public) and of the aggrieved citizen. Judicial review was to be one of a complex of factors which contributed to the relegation of both tort and the criminal law to relatively minor roles in checking the actions of officials in the second half of the 19 th century. This, in a sense, was unsurprising as hitherto both actions in tort and criminal prosecutions had often to be used, in the absence of any other remedy, to settle disputes concerning the actual powers and duties of particular offices.
What is surprising about the law as I have so far described it is that while its concern was with the conduct of officials in their 'fiduciary', 17 or 'trust' 18 relation with the public, it was the common law, not equity which policed that relationship. 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ and then, seemingly, only to protect public funds in the hands of public officials from misapplication 19 or misuse for improper gain. 20 With little by way of equity jurisprudence relating to the setting of standards of conduct for public officials, it is unsurprising that English courts in particular in the mid-20 th century experienced considerable difficulty in providing a satisfactory explanation for imposing what was, in reality, fiduciary regulation of the conduct of public officials. 21 Turning to Australian law, it is clear that for much of our history the law I have so far described was forgotten or ignored. 22 Forgotten also was the language of the 'public trustee' or 'fiduciary' -save, surprisingly, in relation to members of parliament 23 and local government councillors. 24 Nonetheless, events in the second half of the 20 th century have compelled us to rediscover and expand upon laws designed both to sanction abuse of public office and to promote official probity. It is sufficient to refer to what are known colloquially as the Fitzgerald Inquiry 25 and the WA Inc Royal Commission 26 and to the changes these wrought in the standards to be expected of, and applied to, public officials and employees of all stations. 27 What is notable is that, as has been enduringly the case in the United States since the Revolution, 28 the idea of the public trust -of public fiduciary responsibility -is alive and well in informing and justifying the standards of conduct being set. Simply by way of illustration, the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) s 8(1)(c) proscribes 'corrupt conduct' which is defined to include 'conduct of a public official … that constitutes or involves a breach of public trust'. 29 which acknowledge, or are consonant with, the ideas that public officers and employees occupy positions of public trust and confidence which exist to serve the interests of the public, 30 albeit in differing ways, permeate the codes of conduct now widely applied to Members of Parliament, Ministers and Public servants, as also Public Service Rules, Regulations, statements of values and the like. Though the vehicles employed to maintain integrity in government have evolved -as witness the demise of centuries of tort law, but the rise of regulatory agencies concerned with policing official probity -the old, animating ideas remain.
CONTROLLING THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC POWER
If the law mentioned in the first part of this article owed -and owes -little to equity jurisprudence, such is not the case in what follows. My concern here is not with the bases of personal liability of public officials as such, but rather the extent to which orthodox (or adapted) principles of the law of trusts and of fiduciary obligation can, or should properly be permitted to, contrive the legal efficacy of official decision making be it by the Crown, its officers or agencies, or by some other public body or functionary. 31 Because what I have to say is of broad compass, it necessarily will be selective and general. My purpose in this brief space can be only to outline the contours of an argument. To set the scene I will refer, first, to the public law use of the 'Fiduciary Metaphor'; second, to modern statutory interpretation; third, to judicial review; and fourth, to 'fiduciary powers'. I will then address the appropriate use, and limits of, trust and fiduciary law.
(i)
The 'Fiduciary Metaphor' The aphorism -'nothing is so apt to mislead as a metaphor' -comes to life here. I provide the following observations for essentially contextual reasons. They invite misunderstanding. First, Lord Woolf MR in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman:
Parliament confers wide discretionary powers on the government of the day, so that they can be used in the nation's and the public's interests. Local authorities have wide discretionary powers conferred upon them so that they can be used in the interest of the locality and those who reside there. … The recipients of the powers, whether national or local, are in very much the same position as they would be if they had fiduciary powers conferred upon them. The powers are entrusted to them so that they can exercise them on behalf of the public or a section of the public. The public places its trust in the public bodies to exercise their powers for the purposes for which they are conferred. 32 This is a subject of quite some interest in recent Canadian legal scholarship, although it must be accepted that fiduciary law in Canada has followed -and is following -quite different courses to that followed in Australia: see, eg, Breen v Williams (1996) 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Second, in a speech entitled 'Judicial Legitimacy', Gleeson CJ observed:
Judicial power, which involves the capacity to administer criminal justice, and to make binding decisions in civil disputes between citizens, or between a citizen and a government, is held on trust. It is an express trust, the conditions of which are stated in the commission of a judge or magistrate, and the terms of the judicial oath … 33
The Chief Justice went on to observe that the High Court exercises its powers 'in a fiduciary capacity'. The burden of both statements is clear and indisputable, but the descriptions themselves are no more than metaphor. Third, in their work, Administrative Law, Wade and Forsyth made the well accepted 34 comment:
Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely -that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended. 35 In each instance the function of the metaphor is to signify that legal (or constitutional) constraints and obligations attach to the exercise of the public powers and discretions held. 36 The question, though, is whether the 'trustee' or 'fiduciary' labels positively assist our understanding of those constraints and obligations and, in particular, what if anything they add to the now well understood principles of statutory interpretation and of judicial review?
(ii) Statutory interpretation Interpretation, statutory and otherwise, 37 is now widely acknowledged to be contextual and purposive in character. 38 Nonetheless, it is girded by increasingly invoked conventions which can contrive the interpretative process -as, for example, that 'all statutes are construed against a background of common law notions of justice and fairness.' 39 A number of these are designed to protect against adverse or otherwise unacceptable consequences, unless those consequences are shown to have been clearly intended; 40 others, to enhance the operation of the beneficial intent of an Act, as for example, the principle that statutes that can be classified as remedial or beneficial should be interpreted liberally. 41 It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which they were not really used. 43 A like qualification has been adopted in the United States and has demonstrated 'remarkable staying power'. 44 One of the modern justifications advanced for this rule is to ensure democratic accountability for the explicit deprivation of basic rights. 45 This 'principle of legality' 46 requires Parliament to confront squarely 'what it is doing and accept the political cost.' 47 I will refer to this principle as the principle in Potter v Minahan (an early Australian application of it). Because of what I have to say later of the State-indigenous people relationship, I will illustrate its use in a native title setting. Where it is alleged that legislation has effected the total or partial extinguishment of native title, the principle is applied because rights recognised by the common law are said to have been extinguished: if extinguishment is to be procured, a 'clear and plain intent' to do so must be manifest. 48 
As Brennan J commented in Mabo v Queensland [No 2]:
This requirement, which flows from the seriousness of the consequences to indigenous inhabitants of extinguishing their traditional rights and interests in land, has been repeatedly emphasized by courts dealing with the extinguishing of the native title of Indian bands in North America. … [R]eference to the leading cases in each jurisdiction reveals that, whatever the juristic foundation assigned by those courts might be, native title is not extinguished unless there be a clear and plain intention to do so. That approach has been followed in New Zealand. It is patently the right rule. 49
(iii)
Judicial Review It was both predictable and prudential that there would be marked similarities, at least at the core, between the grounds of judicial review both of the exercise of fiduciary powers 50 and of statutory powers given for public purposes. 51 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ function of actually exercising such powers, the court's task in either case was to set the ring to permissible decision making by the respective donees. That courts followed largely similar paths in so doing (at least from the 19 th century) was to be expected. 52 Have the terms of the power been exceeded? Has the power been exercised in good faith for a proper purpose? Was the manner of its exercise unreasonable? Were irrelevant considerations taken into account? Has its exercise been fettered? Etc. 53 Such preoccupations, though, do not require resort to fiduciary principles for their explanation.
Where the two sets of grounds differ is that a trustee and a fiduciary have, distinctly, a duty to act 'in the interests (or best interests)' of their respective beneficiaries. 54 The scope, even the independent existence of, 55 this duty are matters of contest in private law. 56 Nonetheless, it is a duty that has attracted significant legislative recognition or acknowledgement in trustee and corporations legislation in some number of common law countries. 57 This duty marks a crevasse between the two contexts of judicial review ordinarily, but not only, because of a marked judicial reluctance to countenance that a group or class of persons are properly to be characterised as the 'beneficiaries' of a statutory fiduciary or trust regime absent a manifest legislative intent to that effect. I will later illustrate the working out of this, as also the occasional unnecessary attempts made to cross the divide. 'Fiduciary Powers' To begin with the problem of language, there is no uniformly agreed and accepted understanding of what the description 'fiduciary powers' signifies in private law. 58 Here it refers to a power 59 conferred upon a person in his or her fiduciary capacity. 60 As such it imports at least two limiting ideas. The first is that the holder of such a power is, as a fiduciary, entrusted with it to be exercised for the benefit of the persons (the beneficiaries) to whom the fiduciary duty is owed -in whose interests he or she is expected to act. This characteristic is ordinarily wanting in the case of possessors of statutory powers. Their functions, as a rule, are to further public purposes, not the interests of persons as such. Second, such powers characteristically will be specified expressly or impliedly in the instrument under which the fiduciary acts, and can only be exercised for the purposes for which they have been conferred. This characteristic, ordinarily, is shared with the possessors of statutory powers. The private law exemplars of donees of fiduciary powers are trustees, company directors, court appointed receivers and liquidators. 61
(v)
The Use and Limits of Trust and Fiduciary Law To turn now to the fundamental question: When, as a matter of strict law, will (should) the Crown, or other public body or person be a trustee or a fiduciary and thus be amenable to judicial review on grounds of trust or fiduciary law?
I begin with the apparently exceptional case, that of the Crown and trusts. There is long-standing authority stemming from Kinloch v Secretary of State for India in Council 62 to the effect that clear words are required before an obligation of the Crown (or of a Crown servant or agent) in relation to property will be treated as a trust according to ordinary principles, even if described as such in the instrument concerned. Rather, absent clear words, the obligation will be characterised as a governmental or political one -or, as it was put in Kinloch, a trust 'in the higher sense'. 63 It needs to be emphasised, though, as did the joint judgment in Registrar of the Accident Compensation Tribunal v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, that 'Kinloch does no more than state a rule of construction'. 64 Why this distinctive 'rule of construction' -or presumptive bias -should continue to be applied in this country, at least in cases where the trust issue involves the construction of a statute or a contract is no longer self evident given (a) our _____________________________________________________________________________________ 58 See Thomas, above n 52, 25-6. 59 That is, a prescribed capacity to do a specified act or to make a specified decision, that capacity being conferred expressly or impliedly by the instrument under which the authority so to act is conferred.
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That is, the person is a fiduciary in the strict legal sense. 61 See generally Finn, above n 52, ch 2; Thomas, above n 52. 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ contemporary rules of statutory interpretation and contract construction; 65 (b) the use of the 'as nearly as possible … the same' formula in Claims Against the Government legislation in describing the rights of parties in any suit to which the Commonwealth or a State is a party; 66 and (c) our acceptance of statutory, non-charitable, public purpose trusts. 67 Because of the significance context and purpose now have both in the modern rules of statutory interpretation and in applying the so-called 'Kinloch principle', it obviously is appropriate to have regard to the governmental setting in which a trust (statutory or otherwise) is alleged to have arisen and, in so doing, to have particular regard to whether what might be described as a 'trust' reflects in substance no more than a description of purely infra-governmental, administrative arrangements for the effectuation of a governmental purpose -be it for the benefit of a designated class of persons or for the public (or some public purpose) generally. Nonetheless, the conclusion that such was the case should, I suggest, now be one reached as a matter of orthodox construction and not in consequence of a privileging presumption favouring the Crown.
Beyond the Crown, and save for the development of the statutory trust for public purposes, 68 the courts in this country have shown no propensity to find a public body or functionary to be a trustee on other than strictly orthodox grounds. I would note in particular that despite some local advocacy and notwithstanding its reception in other common law jurisdictions, 69 no consideration has been given to adapting to our own purposes that evolving species of 'public' (or 'sovereign') trust of natural resources which has been used in the United States 70 to circumscribe governmental decision making affecting resources in which the public has rights. 71 Council' ); as to this last species of 'trust' -which is not a trust in the strict sense of the term -the High Court has accepted that a public body may be so restricted in the statutorily permitted use it can make of public property vested in it as to be required to hold it on trust for the statutorily permitted purposes. So in Bathurst City Council (1998) 195 CLR 566 land used for a car park and vested in the Council as 'community land' under the provisions of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) was held to be trust property in its hands subject to the limitations on permissible use and disposition of such land prescribed in the Act. 
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Its foundations were discerned in long standing common law, 73 and before that Roman law, doctrine which recognised there were certain natural resourcesnavigable rivers, the sea, the foreshore -in which the public had collective or common rights as, for example, rights of passage, of navigation and to fish. In the late nineteenth century United States courts drew upon these rights and the State's ownership of the foreshore and of the land over which navigable waters flowed to establish a State trusteeship of such land for the benefit and use of the people so that they might enjoy their rights on the waters thereon, whether for purposes of navigation, fishing or passage. That trust required the State to protect and to maintain, and to keep, the common resource in a manner that was in the interests of the public, though this did not totally preclude its re-allocation to some new public need. 74 Interestingly for present purposes, the Supreme Court of India has conceived of this trust in Indian law in these terms:
The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the sea-shore, running waters, airs, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership. 75 Though the case law in the United States is discordant, 76 the public trust has been extended to lands held for other public uses (eg public parks). 77 It is not unfair to say that this doctrine now carries the hopes of advocates of environmental protection. 78 The matter to be emphasised about the United States doctrine is that a principle of statutory interpretation similar to that protecting fundamental rights which was enunciated in Potter v Minahan, is applied to legislation which appears to authorise diversion of trust lands to some other inconsistent use. 79 The only additional comment I would make of this trust is that if it is to have any real place in Australian law protective of public rights, a reconceptualisation of the importance of such rights in our jurisprudence will be necessary. Such rights, unlike native title rights, seemingly are 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ competent legislature.' 81 Beyond trusts, the position with respect to fiduciary relationships is distinctly more complex, the more so when judged by reference to other common law jurisdictions. To begin with two examples to give focus to the issues. First, in Habib v Commonwealth (No 2) 82 the applicant, who had been held in Pakistan, Egypt and Guantanamo Bay, alleged he was illegally detained and tortured by overseas authorities and that the Commonwealth knew of this but did little or nothing to stop it from taking place. Amongst the various claims asserted was that the Commonwealth breached its fiduciary duty to him by not acting on his behalf and in his interests in exercising its power under s 61 of the Constitution when conducting its foreign relations with Pakistan, Egypt and the United States. Secondly, in Franklin Savings Corporation v United States 83 a defunct savings and loans company sued the United States for damages for breach of fiduciary duty in not maintaining the profits of the company when the United States ordered write downs of its capital and then appointed a "conservator" under the provisions of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act 1989 (FIRREA). The basis of the fiduciary claim was that, on appointment of the conservator, the government exercised such an extent of daily supervision over the company's assets as to become its fiduciary yet it failed to conserve the business. To anticipate matters, the claims made in both of these cases were rejected: there was no fiduciary relationship. This is not the place to enter generally on the questions what is a fiduciary relationship and when can it arise. 84 Suffice it to say for present purposes that a public body will ordinarily be characterised as being in a fiduciary relationship with a person (or group or section of the public) if it is so circumstanced in discharging some statutory 85 function, power or purpose capable of affecting the interests of that person 86 as entitles that person, etc reasonably to expect that the public body (i) will act in his or her interests in discharging that function 87 or, exceptionally, (ii) will act fairly to him or her, if the public body is to act in the interests of groups of persons having different rights and interests inter se in the particular matter. 88 Such a relationship can arise because a statutory regime itself creates a relationship having the above characteristics as, for example, in Cubillo v The Commonwealth 89 where it was held that the Director of Native Affairs in the Northern Territory owed fiduciary obligations to the applicants by virtue of his statutory role as their legal guardian, they , of Indian title to part of its reservation (the land to be dealt with on their behalf in a particular way), the Crown was found to have a fiduciary duty to act for their benefit which it breached by dealing with the land contrary to the understanding on which the surrender was made.
The almost invariable issue which arises in these cases is one of construction and characterisation of the statutory powers or duties which are alleged to attract a fiduciary responsibility. It is at this point that most such fiduciary claims are lost. While a person may be benefited or protected by a particular exercise of a statutory power -or for that matter from its non-exercise -the public body having that power will characteristically be able to exercise it in a way which adversely affects or denies that person's interests and will be able lawfully to do so because of the range of interests the body is entitled to consider, protect or promote consistently with the purpose of the power in its legislative setting. As Brennan CJ observed in Wik Peoples v Queensland, 91 in such a case it is impossible for the person who could be so benefited or burdened reasonably to expect the public body to exercise the power in his or her interests.
So in Habib v Commonwealth (No 2) Perram J, in rejecting the Commonwealth's alleged duty to exercise in Mr Habib's interests its constitutional power to conduct foreign relations, held:
To accede to the duty alleged would require this Court to conclude that, in the conduct of Australia's alliance with the US (and in its affairs with Pakistan and Egypt), the Commonwealth was bound to disregard its own interests and, instead, act only in Mr Habib's interests. This proposition is impossible to accept. 92 In Franklin Savings Corporation v United States 93 the claimed fiduciary duty was rejected on the basis that ' [it] should not be imposed on the government where it would be inconsistent with the principal purpose of the statute', the FIRREA having been promulgated to protect depositors and ultimately taxpayers from fallout of the Savings and Loans crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The public, not Franklin, was the intended beneficiary of the legislation.
I should add that where a public body discharges a number of public statutory functions in the discharge of one of which it is in a fiduciary relationship with particular persons or groups, it is not obliged to act in the interests of those persons or groups when discharging any other of its statutory functions which might affect the persons' or groups' interests, unless the body, as a matter of statutory construction of that other function, is also required so to act. This issue has arisen commonly in the United 
Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ Trust cases apart, the cases are few indeed in which it has been held that a public body has had discretionary power conferred on it to be exercised on behalf of, for the benefit of identifiable others. 95 Notwithstanding the many regulatory schemes that have been enacted for purposes protective of the public or sections of it, notwithstanding the ameliorative statutes that have been enacted to provide benefits (pecuniary or otherwise) to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in the community, our courts, understandably, have shown no inclination or need to extrapolate from such legislation, fiduciary relationships between the repositories charged with administering such legislation and the groups who benefit from, or are burdened by, their exercise. Nor should they. Rarely are the provisions in such statutes ones as would give a member or section of the public a fiduciary entitlement in their exercise -hence Lord Brightman's comment in Swain v Law Society: 'The duty imposed on the possessor of a statutory power for public purposes is not accurately described as fiduciary because there is no beneficiary in the equitable sense.' 96 Yet three members of the House of Lords in Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council 97 held in judicial review proceedings that while owing a duty to transport users to promote the provision of 'integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and services', and having the power to make grants to London Transport for any purpose, the GLC also owed 'a duty of a fiduciary character to its ratepayers who have to provide the money' to meet a special rate levied so as to make a grant to London Transport to reduce bus and tube fares by 25 per cent. As Lord Wilberforce said, '[t]hese duties must be fairly balanced one against the other'. 98 This the GLC failed to do by casting an inordinate burden on the ratepayers.
This fiduciary duty to ratepayers provided brief fascination for New Zealand courts 99 before being treated with considerable circumspection prompting a retreat to conventional grounds of judicial review, notably the Wednesbury principles. 100 It has not as yet been determined whether it should be accepted in Australia. 101 There are, in my view, good reasons for reticence in so doing. Despite confident assertions to the contrary, the provenance of this fiduciary duty is open to question. 102 It is not now self-evident why 'any group such as the ratepayers can be singled out as the beneficiary of local government powers'. 103 And it has been properly criticised in De Smith's Judicial Review 104 on grounds germane to the themes of this paper: if the 'fiduciary duty' to the ratepayers is merely an oblique way of referring to the 
Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ orthodoxies. Principles of fiduciary law probably will in the end prove unsuited to regulating issues arising in the State-indigenous peoples relationship. 114 The Canadian and New Zealand courts have nonetheless acknowledged, albeit in differing ways, the need to deal fairly and in good faith with their respective indigenous people in that relationship. This finds expression in the evolving concept of 'the honour of the Crown' in Canadian jurisprudence -a 'duty of honour [which] derives from the Crown's assertion of sovereignty in the face of prior Aboriginal occupation' 115 and, in New Zealand, in its not altogether different duty of 'good faith, reasonableness, trust, openness and consultation'. 116 While Australian law accepts that there is an 'oldfashioned traditional, and almost instinctive, standard of fair play to be observed by the Crown in dealing with subjects', 117 this is seen as little more than one to be honoured by the Crown in conducting litigation. 118 It has not been recognised as privileging our Aboriginal peoples in any way in their relationship with the State. The majority decision in Griffiths v Minister for Lands, Planning and Environment 119 upheld the use of power of compulsory acquisition as a means of clearing land of native title interests in order to effect leases and grants of that land for private purposes. All I wish to say of it is that it is emblematic of the difference I have noted.
CONCLUSION
Pulling together the disparate strands in what I have considered, there are I think four conclusions to be drawn.
The first is that the 'public trust'/'public fiduciary' idea still serves a vital function in informing and shaping the standards of conduct properly to be expected of public officers and agencies. Secondly, more controversially, the characterisation of the State as a trustee for the people of its powers of government is fundamental to an understanding of the contemporary legitimacy and authority of our constitutional arrangements. Thirdly, save where a public trust or public fiduciary relationship arises on orthodox grounds, the use of the 'public trust' or 'fiduciary power' concept to describe how public functions should be exercised for the purposes of judicial review proceedings, while explicable, tends to be an unnecessary distraction -and made the more so by my fourth conclusion. It is that we should recognise, much more than we do, that we now live in an age of statutes and not of the common law. If we are properly to regulate the discharge of public functions in light of interests and values that the common law considers should be acknowledged and protected, the appropriate modern vehicles for this are through our rules of statutory interpretation and our grounds of judicial review of statutory powers and discretions. The courts
